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Crime, insecurity, and corruption: Considering the growth of urban private security 
ABSTRACT 
In this article we call into question the growing presence of private security 
companies (PSCs) in cities throughout the world. Though PSCs have grown 
enormously in recent decades, there exist few academic analyses to consider their 
broad reaching effects. Researchers still have much to understand about the 
relationships between PSCs and changing patterns of urban development, 
governance, and public security. PSCs are prevalent in both the Global North and 
South, yet their presence is perhaps most intense in emerging countries, where 
social inequality is high and public security is tenuous. As such, in this article we 
draw on specific examples from the city of São Paulo, Brazil, where demand is 
soaring for private security and PSCs operate in complicated networks between the 
state, private capital, and organized crime. Our analysis draws attention to the 
paradoxes of urban private security, beginning with the fact that public insecurity is 
in fact good for PSC business. By reflecting on existing published resources – and 
making connections across several disciplines – our goals in this article are threefold: 
1) to highlight the need for more research on PSCs in urban settings; 2) to draw 
attention to the ways private security is changing urban space, and; 3) to suggest 
that the growth of PSCs, rather than being representative of increased public 
security, may in some cases coincide with rising levels of urban crime and insecurity. 
Keywords: Urbanisation and developing countries, Governance, Private security , 
urban, geography 
 



































































The purpose of this article is to draw attention to how private security companies 
(PSCs) are changing urban space, and more specifically to highlight the need for 
academic research considering the relationships between private security and 
processes of urban development, governance, and public security. While there exists 
a growing literature on Private Military Companies (e.g., Kinsey, 2006; Singer, 2001), 
the expanding presence of PSCs in everyday urban space remains vastly 
understudied. In cities across the world, PSCs are increasingly fulfilling state roles of 
public security and urban governance (Diphorn, 2016; Johnston and Shearing, 2013). 
Maintaining security in public space has now expanded beyond two key nodes of 
providership – 1) state providers like the police, and; 2) extra-legal ones that include 
gangs, militias, organized crime, etc. – to include a third, now equally crucial node: 3) 
pseudo-state groups (e.g., PSCs) that enforce state laws and make use of physical 
force, yet do so with only limited state oversight and without sovereign discretion. 
Though vast bodies of literature exist to document the first two of these nodes (e.g., 
Arias, 2006; Garmany, 2014; Rodgers, 2007), researchers have yet to grapple with 
the implications and significance of the third. As such, important questions remain as 
to the roles of PSCs in connected regimes of urban development and everyday 
governance, their relationships to state and extra-legal security providers, and the 
fundamental challenges they pose to state authority and sovereign power more 
generally. 
































































In what follows we consider the ways cities appear to be changing in the 
wake of intensifying private security. Though PSCs can be found in cities throughout 
the world, their presence is especially strong in the Global South where high levels of 
socio-economic inequality combine with low levels of public security (Caldeira, 2000; 
Davis, 2010). Our analysis is therefore grounded specifically in the city of São Paulo, 
Brazil, where the private security sector has grown enormously in just the last thirty 
years (Zanetic, 2012). The implications of our argument, however, are by no means 
specific to Brazil or even the Global South, but rather reflect broader changes to 
urban space and public security (Baily and Dammert, 2005). Moreover, beyond 
simply calling attention to the ways PSCs are changing cities, and arguing that more 
academic research is needed, in this article we go a step further: instead of 
coinciding with increased urban security, we suggest the growth of PSCs may be 
related to increasing levels of crime, corruption, and urban insecurity.      
Work on private security, and the work of private security. 
The existence of private security is by no means a recent development. To be fair, 
private security providers have existed for centuries, in cities as well as elsewhere. 
They can exist formally or informally, be sanctioned by the state or not, operate in 
combat zones or in everyday settings, provide individual or even societal protection, 
and so on. They are historically and in present times very diverse. In recent years, 
however, private security has come under increased scrutiny from academic and 
policy experts (Johnston and Shearing, 2013; Holmqvist, 2005). Reasons for this are 
largely twofold: on the one hand, the use of private security and private military 
have grown immensely, as neoliberal states seek to privatize and outsource 
operations once undertaken by state actors (Avant, 2005; Koonings and Krujit, 
































































1999); and on the other hand, state regulation over private security is often 
ambiguous, an issue that intensifies as private security providers expand and 
diversify their operations (Newburn, 2001; Squires, 2012). Reasons for this ambiguity 
call out for more attention from researchers, perhaps owing to increasing state 
needs for private security services (Zanitec, 2010), while at the same time state 
actors try to distance themselves from violence carried out by private security. As 
instances of conflict between private security and the general public grow more 
common, and cases of lethal action taken by private security continue to mount, 
questions for academic and policy researchers grow more urgent (Percy, 2012).  
While researchers have long paid close attention to two types of security 
providers – 1) state actors like the police, special forces, military, etc., and; 2) extra-
legal ones like gangs, militias, organized crime, and so on – there exist far fewer 
studies of pseudo-state groups like private security companies, surveillance and 
intelligence providers, and for-profit prison services (Paasche et al., 2014). 
Admittedly, definitions for pseudo-state security providers can be quite broad, and 
in this article we follow Holmqvist (2005), defining them as groups licensed by the 
state to provide security/protection, but not authorized to use physical force in the 
same ways or with the same discretion as state security actors (e.g., the police). In 
particular we center our analysis on private security companies (PSCs), which since 
the 1980s have expanded massively in countries throughout the world (Zanetic, 
2012). Once confined mostly to personal protection and the interests of private 
capital, today PSCs carry out a variety of services, even providing public security in 
many urban settings. Tasks traditionally undertaken by state actors are today 
increasingly left to privatized firms (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011).  
































































There are in fact numerous studies considering the use of PSCs in 
international conflict; or more precisely, the use of Private Military Companies 
(Kinsey, 2006; Percy, 2012; Singer, 2001). What differentiates this work from 
research on PSCs, however, relates primarily to the contexts in which they operate 
(combat/conflict zones v. everyday urban settings), and the types of ‘security’ they 
provide (military intervention and international peacekeeping v. personal protection 
and the maintenance of public order). While academic debates over Private Military 
Companies have been prolific (e.g., Avant, 2005; Gallaher, 2012; Gregory, 2010), the 
growing presence of PSCs in cities around the world remains largely under-
researched (Paasche et al., 2014). Today, in both developed and less developed 
countries, PSCs are becoming crucial components of urban security apparatuses 
(Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011; Newburn, 2001; Ungar, 2007). Concerning here is 
that PSCs are not often subject to the same legal obligations as state security 
personnel: they regularly make use of lethal force, yet in many countries PSCs are 
shielded from public scrutiny and state oversight (Percy, 2012). Even more uncertain 
are their potential political ramifications: if the legitimate use of physical force is 
indeed reserved only for sovereign power (Arendt, 1970; Schmidt, 1985; Weber, 
1946), then what challenges might PSCs pose to governance, state legitimacy, and 
democracy more generally?    
In spite of such pressing issues, PSCs continue to grow with few regulatory 
overseers and little public debate. Now ubiquitous in cities throughout the world – 
consider, for example, that the world’s largest PSC is ‘G4S’ in the UK (Abrahamsen 
and Williams, 2011) – their growth is especially robust in cities of the Global South 
(Abrahamsen, 2016). The causes for this growth are myriad, stemming in the first 
































































instance from high levels of socio-economic inequality, insufficient and low-quality 
state resources, and high levels of public insecurity (c.f., Davis 2010; Rotker and 
Goldman, 2002). Important for revealing a host of policing and territorial concerns 
(Paasche et al., 2014), existing research still raises more questions than it answers. 
Serious work remains in order to understand, for example, the effects of PSCs on 
public security administration and law enforcement, the relationships between PSCs 
and state (and extra-legal) security providers, and the potential consequences and 
longer term changes that are likely to emerge in cities where PSCs are prominent 
(see for example Diphorn, 2016).  
To begin unpacking these issues, we focus specifically on the city of São Paulo, 
Brazil. Like many cities in the Global South, São Paulo’s rapid urban growth has 
coincided with a greatly expanded PSC sector in just the last few decades (Zanetic, 
2012). The city serves as an excellent case study site for the processes we consider 
more generally in this article. Yet our purpose here is not to provide a 
comprehensive case study of São Paulo, or even to describe a set of urban security 
changes specific to the Global South. By drawing on specific examples from Brazil, 
we hope to emphasize the need for further investigation and to illustrate the 
urgency of these questions to urban researchers. Our brief analysis of São Paulo’s 
PSC sector also serves to highlight some of the paradoxes of private security, 
building to our larger argument that urban public security may in fact be 
undermined by the growth of PSCs. 
Private security and urban change 
Like other large cities elsewhere in the world, private security in São Paulo began to 
grow significantly in the 1970s. This growth continued through the 1980s, and then 
































































skyrocketed in the ‘90s as crime and urban homicides began to soar. As São Paulo 
grew mostly at the periphery with gated condominiums, apartment blocs, shopping 
malls and private businesses (retail stores, restaurants, etc.), schools, banks, petrol 
stations, and so on, the demand for PSCs grew almost exponentially. A rapidly 
growing city with increasing crime rates was clearly beyond the capabilities of São 
Paulo’s military police, and PSCs stepped in quickly to fill the public security void. By 
the start of the twenty-first century there were already more private security agents 
on the streets of São Paulo then actual police officers (Zanetic, 2012). These changes 
have induced profound effects upon urban space, as São Paulo today has become a 
city where fortified security measures (e.g., walls, gates, surveillance) have become 
representative, rather perversely, of an aesthetically chic urban architecture 
(Caldeira, 2000).  
Startling as this growth might first appear, it in fact reflects broader global 
trends, where by 2005 private security personnel outnumbered police in every 
continent around the world (Zanetic, 2010). What has driven this growth is of course 
multifaceted, stemming in large part from changing state spending priorities and 
governance techniques, an expanding and highly profitable public/private security 
industry, and public perceptions of urban insecurity and everyday violence 
(Abrahamsen, 2016; Davis, 2010). PSCs are thus both symptomatic of structural 
changes in urban development and governance, as well as agents of change for 
public security, urban growth, and political economic decision making processes.    
When considering private security in cities like São Paulo, two important, 
critical questions come immediately to the fore: 1) what exactly is a PSC, and what 
differentiates PSCs from state and extra-legal security providers?; and 2) what 
































































distinguishes urban private security from urban public security in everyday contexts? 
While both of these questions may at first seem clear-cut and even pedantic, they 
are in fact quite difficult to clarify on the ground, so muddled are the linkages 
between PSCs and other forms of urban security. To identify and respond to these 
questions illustrates not only how public policy and academic heuristics are 
complicated by empirical realities, but also how urban space – and more specifically 
understandings of urban space – are changing on account of PSCs.  
To address the first of these questions, we return to our original definition 
for PSCs, describing them as groups licensed by the state to provide 
security/protection, but not authorized to use physical force in the same ways or 
with the same discretion as state security actors. The question of ‘discretion’ (e.g., 
Garmany, 2014; Neocleous, 2000) is key here, and we return to it in the final section 
of the article. To begin, however, we highlight several factors making it difficult to 
untangle PSCs from other security providers (viz., police and militias). While the issue 
of licensing may appear straightforward – for example, PSCs are registered with the 
state whereas militias (i.e., informal security providers) are not – to the general 
public such distinctions often mean very little, and to the urban poor in particular 
(Zaluar and Conceição, 2007). Extra-legal private security is especially prominent in 
low-income areas, where vigilante militia groups are on the rise, often times in 
connection with organized crime (Feltran, 2010). Whether police, PSCs, or informal 
private security, all of these groups carry guns, and rarely do they face criminal 
charges if/when they use them. Further still, all of them wear similar uniforms, 
making it nearly impossible to differentiate one from the other (Zanetic, 2012). Even 
more intermixed are the individual employees themselves: note Zaluar and 
































































Conceição (2007), both PSCs and militias are regularly staffed by off-duty or retired 
police officers, meaning that someone could in fact be working for the police, a PSC, 
and a militia all at the same time.  
If the distinctions between PSCs and other security providers seem 
ambiguous, murkier still are the different roles they serve. On the surface they 
appear to work mostly through deterrence and intimidation, but security in cities 
like São Paulo is rarely so simple. New research suggests that organized crime may 
actually hold sway over large swaths of São Paulo (Denyer Willis, 2015; Feltran, 
2011), raising serious questions for how police and PSCs operate, what work they 
really do, and what networks might connect them to organized crime. For example, 
might PSCs work as intermediaries between crime, the police, and the general public 
– like brokers, as it were, between formal and informal economies – in order to 
provide security for their clients? Related to this, what are the broader business 
networks of private security, linking PSCs with political parties, lobby groups, 
religious organizations, etc., and how do these relationships (dis)connect the state 
and civil society at both municipal and federal levels (Galdeano, 2014)? Even more 
significantly, how might this entanglement of different actors and socio-state 
relationships challenge existing understandings of democracy and urban security? 
Without answers to such questions, researchers face formidable blind spots when 
trying to understand contemporary public security and urban governance in cities 
around the world. 
Turning to our second question regarding the actual differences between 
private and public security in São Paulo, we again draw attention to the intermixed 
actors that (supposedly) define these two sectors. Much like how ‘formal’ and 
































































‘informal’ urban spaces and social practices are crucially linked and mutually 
dependent (Borraz and Le Galès, 2010), distinctions separating state from non-state 
actors – as well as public interests from private ones – also breakdown on closer 
inspection. According to Anthony Pereira (2008), it is not uncommon for Brazilian 
state officials involved with public security to have business ties with the private 
security sector, in some instances even owning and operating PSCs while in office. 
Typical as such cases might seem given Brazil’s reputation for political corruption, 
they are by no means unique to Brazil or even countries of the Global South. 
Consider, for example, that Rudolf Giuliani, former mayor of New York and two-time 
presidential candidate, founded and continues to help oversee one of the world’s 
largest PSCs, “Giuliani Partners.” That elected officials responsible for public security 
in cities around the world are today heavily invested in PSCs provides yet one more 
example of the ways public and private security are becoming increasingly difficult to 
distinguish.     
Even more concerning here, and moving on to our final point that the growth 
of PSCs may be undermining urban public security, are the potential relationships 
between PSC sector growth and instances of urban crime, insecurity, and corruption. 
As just one example, there exists an obvious parasitic relationship between PSCs and 
public security: increasing fears over public safety combined with fewer state 
resources to address such fears are good for PSC business. As such, when some of 
those in charge of public security are simultaneously looking to profit from the 
private sector, it should come as no surprise that initiatives emphasizing protection 
from crime and violence (e.g., PSCs, private prisons, personal firearms) compete with 
































































those to actually reduce urban insecurity (e.g., addressing inequality, instituting 
firearm restrictions, providing mental health facilities).  
Going further, what is perhaps even more harmful to contemporary urban 
security is not so much a lack of state funding or public resources, but rather the way 
public funds are now channeled into PSCs. In São Paulo, writes André Zanetic (2010), 
the state is by far the largest consumer of PSC services, meaning that public security 
is increasingly becoming a privately contracted resource deployed for specific urban 
spaces and special events. Combined with this are hyper-incarceration initiatives 
that also rely on private prison operators, leading to a staggering 576% increase in 
São Paulo’s prison population in just the last two decades (Silvestre, 2016). 
According to multiple studies these tactics have had the perverse effect of producing 
and fortifying organized crime (Adorno and Dias, 2014; Biondi, 2010; Dias, 2013), as 
São Paulo’s prisons are now dominated by Brazil’s largest and most infamous prison 
gang, the PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital). As more and more people are sent to 
prison, the PCC grows in numbers and strength (Dias and Darke, 2015). Granted, 
homicides have decreased over the last 15 years in São Paulo, but whether this is 
indicative of better public security is another question altogether.  
For example, ethnographic research from São Paulo’s most violent 
neighborhoods suggests the PCC is likely behind falling homicide rates rather than 
public security initiatives (Denyer Willis, 2015; Feltran, 2011). Quite simply, 
homicides are bad for PCC business since they draw public attention and police 
inquiry, so killing is officiated – and carried out when deemed necessary – by gang 
members, not the state. As such, São Paulo may have fewer homicides today, but to 
argue that the city is more ‘secure’ or less violent would be shortsighted. Public 
































































security in democratic societies is more than just reduced homicide rates. If indeed 
ethnographic researchers are right, and much of São Paulo is governed by the PCC, 
than it stands that public security is in fact much more tenuous than police officials 
would lead citizens to believe. Crime protection comes mostly from private security; 
crime prevention comes mostly from organized crime; and the idealized notion of 
reliable, state-based public security seems evermore a relic of the twentieth century.   
Not all of these problems of course can be blamed on the growth of PSCs. In 
addition to private security, one must also consider how new policing tactics, 
surveillance technologies, and criminal justice protocol are reshaping urban space. 
Rather than producing equitable and more reliable public security, these processes 
seem to connect in many instances to social injustice, political corruption, and crime 
and urban insecurity, especially for low-income and minority residents. But again, 
plenty of scholarship already exists to consider these factors (e.g., Arias, 2006; Davis, 
2010; Denyer Willis, 2015); what urban researchers lack are studies investigating the 
effects of intensifying private security. The final section of this article considers the 
theoretical implications of such a research agenda, briefly exploring the potential 
consequences of PSC growth, and focusing specifically on questions of urban 
governance and state power.   
Considering an urban private security research agenda 
For decades, scholars have debated what defines state power and contemporary 
sovereignty, returning often to Weber’s thesis (1946) regarding the state’s monopoly 
on the legitimate use of physical force (e.g., Arendt, 1970; Schmitt, 1985). Though 
Weber of course recognized that PSCs could make use of ‘legitimate’ violence when 
authorized by state institutions, such instances generally apply to international 
































































conflict and spaces where the state does not hold sovereign power (c.f., Gregory, 
2010; Singer, 2001). In territories where the state does hold undisputed sway, 
delegating the use of legitimate physical force to PSCs represents a potentially 
momentous shift in sovereign governance. Existing research helps to explain why 
some of these changes might be happening (Abrahamsen, 2016; Davis, 2010), yet 
still to be investigated is the state’s changing relationship with public security, and 
how these changes are likely to alter processes of urban governance, state 
sovereignty, and contemporary democracy more generally (see for example 
Bertelsen, 2009; Hansen and Stepputat, 2006). 
Important here is the issue of state authorization, and indeed what roles and 
responsibilities the state transfers (or not) to private security. Though PSCs are 
authorized in many instances to use lethal force to protect their clients, rarely are 
they allowed to undertake official investigations, engage in pursuits, make arrests, 
etc. (e.g., Diphorn, 2016). They lack ‘discretion’ beholden to state actors like the 
police (Garmany, 2014; Neocleous, 2000). For example, when it comes to 
engagements with the general public, PSCs are (supposedly) bound to stricter codes 
of conduct. Their inability to use discretion means they lack the authority of state 
actors, highlighting one of the major differences between police and PSCs. So long as 
the state retains singular control over discretion, and continues to authorize who 
can use physical force and in what contexts, then the state’s monopoly on violence 
would appear to remain intact even with recent changes in public and private 
security. 
Yet if PSCs are to continue growing, and states continue to outsource public 
security responsibilities (i.e., delegating the use of legitimate violence to pseudo-
































































state actors), how will questions of discretion be negotiated in the future? More 
generally, will the state’s monopoly on violence officially cease to exist (perhaps it 
already has?), and what might this mean for state power in the future? And if, as we 
have argued in this article, the growth of private security may coincide in some 
instances with crime, corruption, and urban insecurity, what will twenty-first-century 
cities look like, especially for those unable to afford private security? The 
ramifications of these changes are enormous for urban landscapes, and deserve, we 
feel, greater attention from urban researchers. We hope this article provides a 
humble step in that direction, sparking greater debate and possible insight for future 
research.     
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